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ON KNOWING ONE'S PLACE: CONSTITUTIONAL
ROLES AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER*
In the course of the time since its decision in Buckley v.
Valeo' the Supreme Court has taken a wrongheaded and now
dangerous position on the relative roles of the President and
Congress. As Justice Jackson so well pointed out in his mas-
terful concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case,' the roles of the
two branches are reciprocal.3 In reducing the power of Con-
gress, it has strengthened the President's power and it has
done so at a time when the country suffers from excess rather
than inadequate executive power.4 The early decisions of this
line were relatively unimportant because they attempted to
defy political reality and were, consequently, largely ignored.
The last of them, however, did great damage in declaring un-
constitutional a last gasp effort by both branches to come to
grips with the national deficit. If Gramm-Rudman 5 turns out
to have been the last successful effort to deal with the na-
tional debt before a crisis occurs, Bowsher v. Synara could be-
come noted as the Schecter Poultry7 case of the end of the
century.'
* Professor of Law and former Dean, Santa Clara University. B.A., J.D., Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, LL.M., J.S.D. Yale. The author wishes to thank his Research
Assistant, Samuel Crump, for his help with this article.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. He opined that presidential power was considerably stronger in the gray area
between congressional authorization and congressional prohibition than it was when
Congress had addressed an issue and declined to give him power to react. Id.
4. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
5. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
or Gramm-Rudman) Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 2 U.S.C. § 901-
922 (Supp. III 1985).
6. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
7. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
8. Congress has fixed the law by providing for an exclusive penultimate cutting
role for the Office of Management and Budget but the health of the act seems in
question. Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987).
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In Valeo,9 the Court reviewed the Election Campaign Act
which, among other things, provided public funds for presi-
dential campaigns and set standards for the campaigns. One
of the issues in the case concerned the appointment of the
supervising members of the Federal Election Commission.
The act provided that some of the members would be ap-
pointed by the President and others by Congress. In its deci-
sion, the Supreme Court struck the latter provisions, indicat-
ing that the President had the exclusive authority to appoint
officers of the United States. The statute was altered to allow
the President to make all appointments.
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,10
the Supreme Court ruled that one-house vetoes were uncon-
stitutional. In a statute allowing the Attorney General to stay
deportation for deportable aliens, Congress provided that
such a stay could be reversed by a vote of either house of Con-
gress. Congress can only act bicamerally and with present-
ment to the President, the Court ruled, declaring the one-
house veto provision unconstitutional. It was not dissuaded by
the large number of bills containing similar one- or two-house
veto provisions."
Neither decision had drastic repercussions. The political
composition of the Elections Commission had been agreed
upon in the underlying act and presidential appointment of
the members presented no problems. Chadha was even more
trivial in application. Every act which provided for congres-
sional veto did so as a matter of political compromise with the
executive branch. The executive branch got broader authority
than Congress would have provided in return for the power in
Congress (or even a congressional committee) to alter un-
wanted results. The arrangement proved so politically useful
that it continued in only slightly altered form after the case.
Congress and commentators competed in naming ways around
9. 424 U.S. 1.
10. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
11. Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol. XlI
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the decision.' 2 As a result, the decisions did not create lasting
political turmoil.
To say that the President is given power not shared by
Congress to appoint officers of the United States says nothing
particularly startling. In the scheme of the Constitution, the
President's role centers on his obligation to see that laws are
faithfully executed.' 3 He and the head of his departments
must generally direct the officers who carry out that obliga-
tion. It is also not unreasonable to think of his authority to
control as fairly absolute vis-a-vis those whose primary task is
ministerial such as postmasters.14 An earlier Court was able to
distinguish between such officers and others whose role was
more complex, and who would be unable to serve their func-
tion if they were not independent. Thus federal administra-
tive commissioners were held to be immunized from summary
presidential dismissal by an act of Congress. 5 Had that deci-
sion been the opposite, administrative agencies would not
have become a significant factor in legal development. Many
decisions made by them would have been left to the courts.
The advantage of specialized consideration and adjudication
would have been lost unless some type of article III special-
ized court had been established." As things turned out, losing
independent administrative agencies would have damaged
presidential power more than undermined the power of Con-
gress since, in the main, such agencies are more beholden to
the executive branch and its agenda than to Congress. It is
significant to note, however, that they are able to maintain a
degree of independence from both branches. This is despite
the fact that they are theoretically at least as much in the
control of Congress, which sets their agenda and provides
them funds, as is the Comptroller General who, the Court said
was a legislative agent.17 The point is, they could not perform
12. See, e.g., Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Executive and Agency
Action after Chadha: 'The Son of Legislative Veto' Lives On, 72 GEo. L.J. 801 (1984).
Elliot H. Levitas is a member of the House of Representatives.
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
14. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
15. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
16. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982) (non article III bankruptcy court held unconstitutional).
17. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181.
19871 809
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in the manner in which they are expected to function but for
some independence from both branches.
It would be foolish to argue that the drafters of the Con-
stitution or the voters who adopted it had a fourth branch of
government in mind. Even the branches they described were
offices of limited scope. But to admit that an idea would not
have occurred to Americans two hundred years ago is hardly
to say it is unconstitutional now. Even in that distant past,
the Constitution was made flexible enough to allow for lines of
executive responsibility which did not end in the White
House. The appointment power expressly recognizes the com-
petence of courts to appoint officers of the United States."8
More recently, based partially on the cases sketched
above, the Court struck down a central provision in the
Gramm-Rudman Budget Reduction Act 19 because the Comp-
troller General of the United States was designated to put
dollar figures to the percentage budget cuts provided in the
act. The Comptroller General was held by the Court majority
to be too beholden to Congress to serve constitutionally in
what it characterized as an executive function.
The author has been a consultant to the two incumbent
Comptrollers General for the last eleven years. That fact
makes the opinion seem especially curious.2 It is the gist of
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It is interesting to note that the Attorney Gen-
eral who has been so forceful in insisting that the Constitution be read literally denies
the authority of Congress to authorize courts to appoint independent counsel to pros-
ecute executive misconduct. Tragically, the primary independent counsel in charge of
matters related to the Iran-Contra controversies, Lawrence Walsh, has agreed with
that concern and has taken an appointment to the Department of Justice to assure
his legitimacy. Russell, Still Probing for Answers, TIME, March 16, 1987 at 27. As the
author has indicated in an op ed piece, the second appointment leaves open the
problems which faced Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox when President Nixon fired
him. Alexander, Special Prosecutor Trap, L.A. Daily J., April 9, 1987, at 4. The con-
cern is unwarranted as the independent counsel law has survived all challenges to
date. In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66
(D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Cf. North v. Walsh, 656 F.
Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987). Now Mr. Meese himself is being investigated by an inde-
pendent counsel (the title Special Prosecutor has been euphemized in the current
version of law). It is unknown whether that special counsel will seek or be offered a
position in Mr. Meese's department.
19. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. III 1985).
20. The opinions in this commentary are, of course, the author's. Nothing in it
has been discussed with the Comptroller General or with anyone in his office. In fact,
he does not know that the commentary is being written.
[Vol. XII
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the majority opinion that the Comptroller is a congressional
agent both because of the nature of congressional control over
his tenure and because he has been held out so to serve. Noth-
ing the author has ever observed in the functioning of the of-
fice gives the slightest clue that the Comptroller General or
any of his principal subordinates shares those conclusions.
Nor need they. In the entire history of the office, no Congress
has ever dismissed an incumbent. No proceedings to do so
have ever been initiated and, as far as the author has been
able to discover, none have been publicly suggested. That fact
should seem all the more surprising to those who believe the
majority's account of the functioning of the office, because it
is often the case that control of Congress shifts during the
term of a Comptroller General. Committee chairs are rou-
tinely replaced in such shifts. The Comptroller General, who
is appointed by the President, never is replaced despite the
fact that dismissing the incumbent would (if one accepts the
Court's view of the office) give the new party in power a per-
son beholden to their perspectives rather than to the perspec-
tives of the deposed political party.
One reason for the job security of the office is that it
serves the interests of both parties to have a semi-indepen-
dent research and investigative office for Congress. Members
already have their own staffs and the staffs of their assigned
committees. For many tasks, they need a non-partisan opin-
ion, and they get it from the General Accounting Office which
the Comptroller General heads. It is then not surprising that
the Comptroller General was chosen for the important penul-
timate step in budget reduction in the likely event that Con-
gress would default on its agreement to cut the budget to
meet Gramm-Rudman targets. 21 The President would not
have agreed to this role had he been perceived as a congres-
sional agent. The Congressional Budget Office might then as
well have been given the job. Congress also saw him as neutral
and thought he could contend with the anticipatedly execu-
tive department oriented views which might come from the
Office of Management and Budget. He was given a minor role.
In five days he had to reconcile two views of supposedly
21. 2 U.S.C. §§ 902-922.
1987]
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automatic cuts: those of the Office of Management and
Budget and of the Congressional Budget Office.22 In the eyes
of the realists on Capitol Hill, he was the natural person for
the job. His role seemed so well tailored to their perception of
what was needed that no other agent was named in the event
the Court decided as it ultimately did.
For the Court, the ability of Congress to remove the
Comptroller General by impeachment or by joint resolution
grounded in inefficiency, neglect of duty or other listed
causes, 23 made him a legislative official while requiring him to
make the budget cutting recommendations involved him in
executive functions. To permit Congress to remove the Comp-
troller General would effectively give Congress control over
enforcement of laws he administered, the Court announced. It
would be similar to a legislative veto since Congress could re-
move an offending Comptroller General.
At least in one sense, removal is similar to the result of
the legislative veto case. In a practical sense, the Court misses
the realities of government cooperation and dispute resolu-
tion. There are many ways in which the Comptroller General
is beholden to Congress. Congress can hamstring his work by
legislation in exactly the same manner in which it can ham-
string any branch of government. It can cut his appropriations
so as to effectively eliminate his work. Perhaps it can even
eliminate the position of Comptroller General despite his pre-
sent fifteen year contract. Alternatively, they can increase his
work, require him to make additional reports to Congress or
to its committees, or provide that additional steps be taken
prior to the completion of work. In all of these respects, the
Comptroller General is no different from any other federal
employee. All of these restrictions can be applied to the Presi-
dent and the courts. Surely the threats of such reprisals do
not convert either the executive branch or the courts into leg-
islative agents. Yet the power to impose such Draconian
measures, which are in more moderate form accustomed ac-
22. Id.
23. The statute provides the following removal grounds: permanent disability,
inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, commission of a felony, or conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 31 U.S.C. §§ 701-779 (1982).
[Vol. XII
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tions,24 is a far more pressing threat to the Comptroller Gen-
eral than the threat of outright dismissal which it has never
attempted. All require bicameral action and presentment as
does dismissal. Actually there is even one discharge procedure
through which Congress can constitutionally avoid present-
ment: impeachment. The Court makes no reference to that
threat presumably because impeachment is a clearly constitu-
tional legislative process for controlling executive and judicial
officers.25 It happens to require a lower mass of legislative
agreement than a veto override which might be anticipated if
Congress attempted to fire a Comptroller General who had in-
gratiated himself to the President since the House need only
vote the articles of impeachment by a majority.26 Indeed, if
one were inclined to see political interaction by the worst case
analysis used by the Court, one might note that the Court it-
self could presumably be silenced, at least prospectively,27 by
the same arsenal of congressional tools. Should the decision in
Bowsher be disregarded because the Court's independent
functioning is compromised by congressional power? The
reader will insist, and should, that the illustrations drawn are
far-fetched and unrealistic. Indeed they are. Equally so is the
control Congress exercises through the power to fire the
Comptroller General.
The Court's insistence on characterizing the Comptroller
General's Gramm-Rudman functions as executive is equally
unpersuasive. For the majority, the act is executive because it
requires the actor to "interpret the provisions of the Act to
24. See, e.g., the President's duty to report to Congress under the War Powers
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, (1973). Congress can get tougher than
that. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (removing Supreme Court
jurisdiction as it was about to hear a case).
25. The causes constitutionally acceptable for impeachment are more restrictive
than the causes allowing removal of the Comptroller General by joint resolution but
their definition is left to the Court in impeachment (the Senate plus the Chief Justice
in case of presidential impeachment). For a Comptroller General supposedly fearful
of congressional punishment, being impeached for a fancied high crime or misde-
meanor might rank as high as being found inefficient.
26. In both cases a two thirds vote of the Senate is required. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
3, cl. 7 (impeachment); § 6, cl. 3 (veto override).
27. Compare McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 with United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
19871 813
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determine what budgetary calculations are required."28 Suc-
cinctly put: "Each of the three constitutional branches of gov-
ernment, as well as administrative agencies, perform duties
that require interpreting statutory directives as well as exer-
cising judgment that affects the application of the law."29 Is
the Court's Bowsher decision an executive act? Characterizing
governmental acts as executive and legislative is both futile
and unrealistic.30
The essential problem in the Court's approach to separa-
tion of power is a misperception as to the constitutional de-
sign. The Court has apparently conceptualized the three
branches as essentially independent and has branded crossing
over to the functions of another branch a violation of separa-
tion of powers. The power which checks usurpation by an-
other branch is, presumably, the inability of that branch to
reach into the functioning of a sister group. As all branches
need the other two in some respect, that need constrains their
power. Of course, the three branches are designed to keep
each other from arrogations of power and in part that is ac-
complished by separating their functions and providing a
place for each. In important respects, however, just the oppo-
site is true. One branch has a specific significant role in the
functioning of another branch. Impeachment has already been
mentioned. It would appear to be a judicial function but it is
given to the legislature. When Congress sits in its most intru-
sive capacity, that is when it is charging the President, the
third branch participates as well through the Chief Justice
who presides at the trial.31 If the President does not follow the
law, Congress need not function through bicameral legislation
and present its findings to the object of its inquiry for
approval.32
The examples abound. At least one important control is
given each branch in the operation of the others. Legislation is
28. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
29. The Supreme Court, Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 226 (1986).
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl, 7.
32. We might know more about this process than we do had the Supreme Court
not arrogated the impeachment inquiry in President Nixon's case by resolving the
central question of the ability of the public to hear his taped office conversations.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
[Vol. XII
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presented to the President not only for execution but initially
for his approval."3 If he fails to approve it, the legislature is
forced to repass it by a two thirds vote if it is to become law.3"
Thus, in effect, the President is the most important legislator
because his vote counts as much as the votes of one person
less than one sixth of each house. The courts are equally con-
trolled by Congress. The Constitution expressly allows Con-
gress to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. 5 The Supreme Court, in turn, acts as the
final arbiter of the constitutionality of congressional legisla-
tion3" and presidential action.3 7 The President, with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, fills the Court's vacancies.38
In the grand design of the Constitution, balance of power
is in significant part created precisely by cooperative inte-
grated roles. Forcing any one of the three branches into the
strict compartmentalization the Court seems to seek would
dramatically alter the structure the founders and voters
created.
The tragedy does not, however, lie simply in the Court's
misperception of reality. The isolation from political life
which generates such problems is closely linked to an essential
function which the Court performs when it must hold out for
constitutional values against the prejudices of the day.39 It is
the isolation that allowed it to break the logjam of racial dis-
crimination in Brown v. Board of Education."° It broke subur-
ban dominance in political representation by announcing that
the Constitution required "one man, one vote."' 1 It allowed
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
36. That power is not to be found in the express language of the Constitution. It
dates from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), but it has become part
of the conventional wisdom of our culture.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure case), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
38. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. The fact that was recognized by the drafters. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
78 (A. Hamilton).
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Of course, it was the same isolation that had allowed it
to create the problem by announcing that separate equality was constitutionally suffi-
cient. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 588 (1964).
1987]
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people sexual expression which in many states had been sup-
pressed by legislative enactment of majoritarian morality.2 Of
course, its major human rights blunders must be thrown into
the balance. 3 Even so, the Court's record of protection of in-
dividual rights over time is remarkable and its role in doing so
was pioneering. One can define the autonomy about which
Americans are proud partially in having a Constitution and a
Supreme Court that insists it be followed even when its edicts
are unpopular."
In the protection of other rights, the record of the Court
is less enviable. Lochner v. New York"' stands out as an
agreed example of a prior Court's excesses in pursuing its view
of ordered liberty." There are many other examples of an era
in which the Court thought its protection of individual eco-
nomic autonomy required it to oppose public regulation. The
ultimate focus of the Court's position became the extensive
regulation proposed by the Roosevelt administration during
the New Deal period. It struck down a number of key laws.4
The story of its change of heart after President Roosevelt's
42. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). It later also dampened the ef-
fects of changing sexual mores. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)
(homosexual sodomy); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (adultery).
43. See, e.g., Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (approving criminalization of homosexual
sex); Koramatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (approving Japanese-American
citizen wartime forced relocation); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857) (treating freed slaves as property). Its lack of hold on political reality has led it
astray in other fields as well. See, e.g., United States v. Krass, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
(bankruptcy foreclosed to those who cannot pay filing fee); Appalachian Coals v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (low price of coal during Great Depression was
largely due to necessary coal byproducts and aggressive marketing); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (employees had liberty to alter the conditions of employ-
ment by contract).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
45. 198 U.S. 45.
46. See, e.g., Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competi-
tion, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983); Garfield, Privacy, Abortion and Judicial
Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986).
47. E.g., Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (act
exceeds congressional commerce power); Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495 (National
Industrial Recovery Act exceeds congressional commerce power and amounts to ex-
cessive delegation of authority); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (regu-
lation of coal production improper because it is local activity); United States v. But-
ler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Agricultural Act beyond congressional commerce power).
HeinOnline  -- 12 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 816 1987
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landslide victory in 1936 is well known. 8 It demonstrates the
unremarkable fact that even an isolated Court cannot defy the
focused disagreement of the executive and legislative branches
indefinitely."9
In the post World War II period, the Court has notably
tried to reconcile its confessed error in the economic rights
cases with an increasingly aggressive position in the protection
of non-economic individual rights. The touchstone has been
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,8" which
distinguishes between general regulation on the one hand and
the rights of discreet and insular minority populations on the
other.5' The Court's role is seen as a reciprocal to the political
process. Where the political process is viewed as providing
protection against excess in economic regulation, the Court
can maintain a weak role in which it rarely interferes with
Congress. Minority groups, especially blacks because of their
ancestry of American slavery, were historically under-
represented in and by those sent to Congress and in the bene-
fits enacted.2 The Court found itself justified in acting more
forcefully on their behalf.53 Had the Court concerned itself
48. Following his inauguration in January of 1937, President Roosevelt launched
an attack on the Court and proposed that a new justice be appointed for any judge
who remained on the Court after he reached 70. He pleaded his case to Congress and
to the public through his radio addresses. See SEN. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937). President Roosevelt's plan was rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee in
June, 1937 but already the Court had begun to sustain New Deal legislation. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National
Labor Relations Act).
49. One can speculate about the role President Roosevelt's proposal to pack the
Court had in bringing about the change of heart. S.1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
It is, in fact, a tribute to the strength of the Court that the proposal was defeated in
Congress. Conclusion of Adverse Report of Senate Judiciary Committee, SEN. REP.
No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
50. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
51. See, e.g., Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COL. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Bowling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (declaring racial school seg-
regation in Washington, D.C., unconstitutional).
53. The difference is perhaps best seen in the standards applied in equal protec-
tion cases. When a statute is attacked because its classification is economically unfair
to one group or another, the Court reviews the statute under the rational relationship
standard which is so weak that not a single statute has been invalidated under it
since World War II (except for Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) itself overrruled
in New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)). If, on the other hand, the classification
is racial, a compelling interest standard is applied. It can rarely be met. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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with a similar reciprocal role theory during the heyday of its
review of economic regulation, it might well have concluded
that a strong role was not called for. Unless one considers the
wealthy to be a discreet and insular minority in need of pro-
tection from the hordes who would otherwise strip them of
their wealth, it is difficult to find a power imbalance worthy of
Court strength. The wealthy have been called on to provide a
disproportionate share of national expenses through progres-
sive taxation but have also been protected in the use of their
wealth to express their political ideas and to reward those who
agree with them." Indeed, the high costs of communication
have given some edge to candidates who can draw on personal
wealth in their campaigns. A number of well known multi-mil-
lionaire political figures hold office today.5 The author is not
aware of a significant wail of political impotency made either
by or for the wealthy.
Applying a theory of reciprocal strength to the issues of
separation of power leads to the conclusion that the Court is
grossly overexerting itself in this field. Based simply on the
ability of the competing sides to persuade the people to their
respective positions, the Court is clearly not needed. Anyone
interested in the views of either the administration or Con-
gress respecting Gramm-Rudman issues has but to consult the
newspapers of the time. The President of the United States is
capable of taking issue with congressional perspectives pub-
licly and articulately and Congress is not shy about respond-
ing. The recent public hearings concerning funding of the
Contra forces is a good illustration. If those two branches can
reach an accommodation, as they did in the passage of
Gramm-Rudman, in whose interests need the Court
intercede? Does anyone believe that either Congress or the
President would press a position that they believed unconsti-
tutional in the absence of a Court to correct them? To say so
54. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating
law which placed limit on personal contributions to support or oppose ballot mea-
sures). First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating law
restricting expenditures by banks and other corporations on referendum issues). But
see Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (upholding spending limits in Federal Election Campaign Act).
55. Senator Nelson Rockefeller, Jr. of New York and Governor Pierre DuPont of
Delaware are prominent examples.
[Vol. XII
HeinOnline  -- 12 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 818 1987
Separation of Powers
is not to imply that the two branches are equal in power.
They are not, and true scales would show that presidential
power overwhelms congressional power. 6 That, of course,
makes the Bowsher decision worse.
It would, in any event, be one thing for the Court to insist
on some clear and contrary position respecting legislative
functions expressed in the Constitution. If, for example, the
Constitution expressly vested in the executive branch power
to control the federal budget, one might argue for a Court rule
in insuring adherence to the document irrespective of whether
the other branches needed bolstering. It is difficult to imagine,
however, that under such circumstances a President would
have acquiesced in Gramm-Rudman.
Especially when the constitutional issue is based on an
interpretation of language which is quite inexplicit on the
point, the Court might better defer to the other branches
which have experience in such matters. Its insistence on being
the decision maker is, in fact, a larger breach of a proper doc-
trine of separation of powers than the position of either the
President or Congress in such matters.
The Court has often discussed separation of power as
though the balance was to be struck between two branches
rather than among three. Doing so obscures the fact that the
document indicates at least equal concern that the courts be
limited. The judicial power of the United States is the most
modestly endowed power of the three. Aside from limited
original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is only given appel-
late power subject to congressional limitation and provided
only with a set of such lower courts as Congress establishes.5
Perhaps in recognition of its powerlessness, the Court's princi-
pal functionaries are given lifetime appointments and salary
guarantees. 9 The Court is awarded so little authority in
constitutional adjudication by the express language of the
56. "The first concern is that the pivotal institution of the American govern-
ment, the Presidency, has got out of control and badly needs new definition and-re-
straint." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at x.
57. Occasionally, it sees its own role in perspective. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Court is improper branch to eval-
uate congressional determination of essential state functions).
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
59. Id.
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Constitution that it took its own self-adjudicated claim in
Marbury v. Madison"° to make it a major participant.
One might review a number of prior cases from that per-
spective. Two suffice to make the point. In United States v.
Nixon,"1 the Court nominally considered whether the Presi-
dent could be compelled to give testimony in a criminal prose-
cution of his former aides. The case was understood by all
concerned to have a far different purpose. During the course
of its considerations of a bill of impeachment, the House of
Representatives had become aware that the President had
secretly taped conversations in the oval office; it wanted to
hear them to help resolve issues under consideration. Nixon
refused to release some of the tapes requested. The tapes were
also being requested by the defense in the cases of several
Watergate defendants. The defendants brought the issue to
the courts.6 2 The President raised the stakes, when the case
had reached the Supreme Court, by indicating that he would
only be bound by a "definitive" opinion of the Court.8 The
Court met his challenge by issuing a unanimous opinion that
he release the tapes.64 Shortly thereafter, President Nixon re-
signed, never having been impeached. 5
The Constitution is quite explicit as to how the impeach-
ment of a President is to take place. The process involves
both houses of Congress serially with the Chief Justice sitting
in the Senate to preside over the trial.6 There is no other role
prescribed for the Court. To be sure, the Court was not speak-
ing directly to impeachment but it was on notice throughout
the presentation of the case that it was central to the process
of impeachment.
In other contexts, the Court has invoked its self-imposed
doctrine of avoiding political questions to allow issues to
be resolved by a more appropriate branch. 7 Caught in the
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
61. 418 U.S. 683.
62. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 287 (1979).
63. Id. at 292.
64. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683.
65. THE BRETHREN, supra note 62.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
67. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Court refused to hear
challenge to Vietnam War).
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limelight of national publicity, it did not use it here. 8 In a
manner far more blatantly circumventing constitutionally es-
tablished procedures than was true of the Gramm-Rudman
scheme, the Court decided it was the appropriate branch to
act.
Similarly, it asserted the right to resolve the question of
who was to be seated in Congress. Adam Clayton Powell was
elected to a seat in Congress. His career was colorful in many
respects. He was thought to be eluding civil process in his
home state and allegedly had misapplied House funds. That
he was black probably added to the furor in Congress. The
House of Representatives voted to refuse to seat him based on
his misdeeds. The Supreme Court ultimately held that it had
no power to do so as he met the three express qualifications of
office: age, citizenship and residence. 9 It did not appear to
trouble the Court that judging the qualifications of members
of Congress is expressly allocated to Congress in the Constitu-
tion.7 0 Again, the provision appears far more clearly expressed
than the prohibition on using officers such as the Comptroller
General for duties such as Gramm-Rudman budget cuts.
7 1
68. The resulting opinion was weak, probably because the Court felt a need to
avoid the presidential challenge of disobedience to a small majority. It also inciden-
tally established grounds for invoking a theretofore underdeveloped doctrine of exec-
utive privilege which will make it harder to reach presidential papers in the future.
Whatever the other merit of the opinion, however, it accelerated the departure of
Richard Nixon.
69. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
70. "Each House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Mem-
bers .... U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
71. It is true that the provision for refusal to seat allows House resolution by a
mere majority rather than the two thirds vote required to expel. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
5, cl. 2. If a mere majority could refuse to seat, the party in power might in the future
use the provision to disadvantage the minority party. There are three responses to
that concern. It was not this case and had never happened. The vote not to seat in
fact carried by more than the two-thirds majority required to expel though one can-
not be sure that all of those voting for it would have also voted to expel. If the Court
had indicated that the matter was not justiciable because of the constitutional alloca-
tion of power to Congress, the majority party trying to unseat their opponents would
be forced to defend their political action politically. That is, they would not have the
Court's imprimatur on their interpretation of their own power.
Contemporary judicial activism began innocently enough in the hallowed tradi-
tion of negative judicial power, but the absence of constraint proved its undoing.
Guided only by notions of policy, the Court could find no reason to refrain from
"legislating" as to how its constitutional interpretations were to be administered.
Basking under the umbrella of "equity" jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to direct
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In both cases, the Court did more than to assume a role
that the author asserts was given to another branch. In both
cases, the Court undermined Congress by patronizingly per-
forming its functions. Neither impeachment nor the refusal to
seat a black representative from a black district are politically
easy tasks. In depriving Congress of the experience of dealing
with them, the Court also diminished the role of the legisla-
ture as a responsible body. The decisions that needed to be
made were difficult and many in Congress were no doubt
pleased that they did not have to have their votes on these
matters recorded but if they were the body to have done so,
the Court should have permitted them to act, perhaps to fail.
the manner and means of such large-scale projects as gradual school desegregation
and the implementation of "one-man, one-vote" reapportionment of every conceiva-
ble voting unit. Even Bentham would have to have been impressed by such massive
positive power. But where is the answer to the framer's question: If the courts are
exercising positive (legislative) power, what branch is exercising negative (judicial)
power in reviewing the judiciary's legislation? No answer is necessary to that question
if one lacks conviction that the genius of the framers is reflected in their grasp of the
importance of negative power. If proponents of "liberal" activism are inclined to ig-
nore that question, they may soon face a true test of their disdain for negative power:
the deployment of positive power by "conservative" judicial activists.
Advocates of judicial legislation in the guise of constitutional interpretation may,
nonetheless, assert that they are true Benthamites in their advocacy of positive
power. But Bentham has one final point to pose for their consideration: the notion
that the true foundation of all power including judicial power is to be found in the
habit of obedience. Activists do not like to be reminded of the constraints imposed on
judicial power by the liinits of public toleration. But public opinion can be ignored
only .temporarily and at the peril of eroding the legitimacy of judicial action. Judges
such as Felix Frankfurter, sensitive to the costs of reckless judicial gambits, warned
against the follies of such adventures.
Our past teaches that when the Court wanders too far from the path laid out by
public opinion, the public reaction usually results in such a reining in of the Court as
to make it largely a non-factor in public life for a few decades. Such was the fate of
the Court in the reconstructionist backlash following the Civil War. Either following
or in the place of a period of "conservative" activism, such a period of nascence may
perhaps be getting underway for the Court once again. If so, Bentham would under-
stand why. Public opinion can be ignored, but not forever.
Meanwhile, the Court during its period of recuperation will have an opportunity
to reflect on the significance of negative power and the importance of judicial philoso-
phy. In so doing, they will learn that there is often wisdom to be found in the misun-
derstandings of others. The comprehension of the American Constitutional structure
by both Bentham and Dicey was admittedly defective. On the other hand, the wis-
dom to be found in studying their errors makes studying them more profitable in a
way than if their understanding had been more complete.
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It should not be forgotten that the Court is the least dem-
ocratic branch of government. It is intentionally insulated to
make countermajoritarian decisions when the majority threat-
ens a minority interest protected by the constitution. When
there does not appear to be a minority in need of protection
and especially when the Constitution has itself expressly re-
served the matter for resolution by a democratically responsi-
ble branch, Court resolution is arrogation.
It cannot be asserted that Congress is expressly constitu-
tionally entitled to use the Comptroller General in imple-
menting its legislation, but it can be noted that the Court is
asserting its role in an undemocratic resolution of a matter
which democratic process had adequately resolved. Further,
the decision comes after a line of cases in which the Court has
expressed its indifference to its own arrogation of power.
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